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The State of Relief on the
Bangladesh-India Border
Delwar Hussain
 
Introduction
1 The NGO phenomenon in Bangladesh began soon after  it  was founded in 1971 when
international  donors felt  that  the government had little  or no capacity to efficiently
process the development aid coming into the country. Donors thought funds could be
spent less wastefully through such organisations. Today NGOs also fit into donors’ new
policy agenda of stressing good governance as well as the wider, long-term ideology of
economic and social  reforms.  White (1992:  12)  observes  that  at  one extreme are the
massive  projects  of  multilateral  and  bilateral  donors  who  strengthen  the  national
infrastructure (roads, bridges or electricity) and at the other is the multitude of smaller
organisations  using  foreign  funds  for  the  welfare  or  development  of  disadvantaged
groups. Some of the latter organisations are in charge of neighbourhood development
projects whilst others run massive enterprises and have (inter)national ambitions and
reach. Some observers celebrate the roles NGOs play, seeing them as a crucial force for
improving the quality of life of countless Bangladeshis. With the inability of consecutive
governments  to  provide  services  (due  to  ineptitude  and/or  lack  of  resources),  these
endeavours,  it  is  argued,  contribute to the state’s  viability and stability (White 1992:
12-13). On the other hand, critics argue that the optimism that NGOs may help to decrease
poverty has not proven to be justified. They say that the industry has propelled sections
of the local middle classes into prosperity by providing jobs and access to resources,
whilst the majority continue to languish at the bottom. Opponents also claim that the
expansion of NGOs has advanced the ‘retreat’ or ‘rolling back’ of the state (Sobhan 1997,
Rahman  1999),  ‘cut  away  ground  from  beneath  a  still-weak  state’,  eroded  public
accountability and provided the loosely connected international aid community with the
opportunity to intrude upon domestic policy (Lewis 2010: 10). Wood (1997) for example
believes that Bangladesh is moving towards a ‘state without citizens’ in that, as a result of
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patronage  relationships  and  structural  adjustment  policies,  it  has  ‘discarded’  its
responsibilities to its  citizens for service provision.  More than 30 years ago,  Rahman
Sobhan (1982: 226), a prominent Bangladeshi academic wrote:
The  sovereignty  of  the  Bangladesh  nation  state,  in  its  prevailing  social
configuration, is therefore likely to remain a polite fiction which is perpetuated by
the courtesy of the donors as long as Bangladesh does not challenge their current
strategic assumptions and ideological preconceptions. 
2 The pervasiveness of NGOs is part of  the neoliberal state which operates by working
alongside  a  myriad  of  non-state  actors  (e.g.  aid  organisations,  volunteers,  private
companies, entrepreneurs, consultants, security companies) which together bring about
and  produce  ‘state-like’  effects.  In  this  way,  the  state,  in  its  ‘multiple  incarnations’
continues to be a powerful  object  of  encounter even when it  cannot be located as a
unitary  structure  (Aretxaga  2003:  398).  The  idea  of  multiple  governing  agencies
challenges  the idea  of  the  state  as  a  single  centre of  power,  and is  an extension of
‘governmentality’. Foucault’s (2006) powerful statement goes beyond the more simplistic
argument about the ‘weakening’ or ‘eroding’ of the state, and is a useful tool in analysing
transformations of the state and how various, multiple forms of power are exercised.
Foucault suggests that power has to be examined in a multi-dimensional form, taking into
account factors such as economy, politics and history. The 18th century saw the rise of a
new  type  of  sovereign  power,  he  says,  where  the  practices  of  government  became
‘multifarious and concern[ed] many kinds of people’ (both internal and external to the
state). This included a multiplicity of differing techniques of domination, discipline and
regulation of  bodies and populations,  leading him to suggest  that ‘we find at  once a
plurality of forms of government and their immanence to the state’ (2006 [1991]: 134).
Foucault (2006 [1991]: 134) questions the notion of the (European) state (the archetypal
model) as ever having been a unified, supreme container of power, or ever having ‘this
individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to speak frankly, this importance’. 
3 Ferguson  &  Gupta  (2005:  107)  extend  this argument  and  formulate  the  idea of
‘transnational governmentality’ to view the contemporary changes being wrought to the
state system, the core feature of which places the ‘governing-practices’ of subnational,
supranational  and  other  non-state  institutions  and  actors  within  a  single  analytical
framework.  This  means  exploring  the  workings  of  the  state  alongside  those  of
deterritorialised institutions of global governance such as the World Trade Organisation,
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as those already mentioned.
Corporate,  globalised  media  and ‘international  public  opinion’  are  also  amongst  this
multiplicity of governing agents, all of which work alongside existing, localised actors.
Rather than describing these global entities as being ‘below’, ‘above’ or even outside the
workings of the state,  Ferguson & Gupta (2005:  121) say they are ‘integral  parts of a
transnational  apparatus  of  government’  and  components  of  an  emerging  system  of
transnational governmentality.1 The fusing of the local and global, they suggest, does not
replace or necessarily challenge the older system of nation states, but it does transgress,
disregard  and  ‘decentre’  previous  understandings  of  the  developmentalist  state
framework. 
4 In  this  paper,  I  focus  on  a  remote  part  of  the  Bangladesh-India  border  in  order  to
understand how the state in its current neoliberal avatar, has been reconfigured from its
older, developmental paradigm, which involved large-scale infrastructural change and
resource  redistribution.  I  describe  how the  state  is  now merely  one  of  many  other
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multiple  governing  agencies  that  participate  in  producing  ‘state-like  effects’  on  a
territory  and  its  population.  Sometimes  these  are  in  competition;  often  they  work
alongside  one  another.  This  understanding  of  ‘state-like  effects’  is  in  keeping  with
Aretxaga’s powerful argument that in the era of globalisation, practices of legibility and
control are carried out by a variety of organisations and take a variety of forms that
together produce ‘state-like effects’. What this means is that the state has lost many of its
ordering  functions  such  as  the  organisation  of  health  care,  education,  economic
production,  imprisonment  and  military  and  policing  interventions,  and  that  these
functions  and roles  are  now contracted out  to  private  companies,  aid  organisations,
NGOs,  private entrepreneurs,  security companies and warlords.  As a  result,  the state
continues to be a powerful object of encounter even when it cannot be directly located
(Aretaxga 2003: 399). This paper is, then, an exploration of what ‘state like effects’ look
like in a place such as the border between Bangladesh and India. 
5 I begin by firstly providing an historical overview of the rise of NGOs in Bangladesh. I
then draw out what the state attempted to be post independence through the example of
a cross-border coal  mining village called Boropani2 and its neighbour,  a now defunct
state-run industrial site. Known as the Khonighat Limestone Mining Project, it was built
in the 1960s  to furnish the country with limestone,  but  importantly it  constituted a
project of a different order: an ideal of the state in microcosm. Following this, using the
example of a NGO relief programme, I show the blurred line between the state and the
NGO  sector.  I  conclude  that  regardless  of  who  is  performing  state-like  effects,  vast
numbers of people continue to be marginalised. 
 
History of Development
6 The contemporary Bangladeshi state is a part of other governing agencies that produce
‘state-like effects’. However, against some of the writers cited above (both supporters and
critics  of  NGOs)  who  argue  that  neoliberalism alone  has  fractured  the  link  between
nation-states, sovereignty and territoriality, I suggest that post-colonial countries such as
Bangladesh have always had mediated sovereignty. This is a phenomenon that has simply
continued into the present to the extent that international donor agencies and regulatory
authorities have almost as much authority as states themselves. In this light, Sobhan’s
forewarning  above  about  international  aid  ‘eroding’  Bangladesh’s  sovereignty  is
misconceived. Bangladeshi sovereignty has always been at the whim of many centres of
power. Even before 1971, when the country was established following an armed struggle
against West Pakistan (East Pakistan later became Bangladesh), the centre of power/s
were located elsewhere.  Kaviraj  (2000:  142)  argues that  in ‘traditional  subcontinental
society,’  political  power  was  often  distributed  between  several  layers  of  authority
stretching from the village, through regional kingdoms, to empires. From the Mughals,
through to the East India Company and the British Imperial state, power lay in Delhi,
Calcutta and London respectively.  During the Pakistan period,  economic and political
clout  resided  in  Karachi  and  Islamabad.  Throughout  and  beyond  the  Cold  War,
Washington, Beijing and Moscow were crucial sites for the realities of East Pakistan. The
Middle East is also key to this argument, with the majority of the country’s population
being Muslim, but also because a large amount of aid today comes from Saudi Arabia. The
suggestion that  Bangladeshi  sovereignty is  dissipated between different agents is  not
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particularly new. What is, is the myth of wholeness itself and the idea of the unity of the
country’s sovereignty. 
7 Sheikh Mujib (head of the Awami League party and leader of the party during the revolt
against  the  Pakistani  state  in  1971)  inherited,  as  Prime  Minister  of  the  new  state,
economic chaos that was partly a consequence of the systematic disadvantaging of the
Eastern wing by the Western wing of Pakistan.3 The struggle for independence aimed to
bring this disparity to an end. But the civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis
made the difficulties of the new country worse. Over 80% of the population lived below
the poverty line (van Schendel 2009: 221). Critics on the left insisted that Bangladesh
implement  state  socialism and land reform.  The  right  saw the  solution in  economic
liberalisation and support for the private sector (van Schendel 2009: 193). In keeping with
its declared socialist principles of state capitalism (it received aid and support from India
and  the  Soviet  Union),  the  Mujib  government nationalised  industries,  banks  and
commercial  companies  (Alam  1995:  95).  However,  these  policies  failed  to  make  the
industries profitable or pull the country out of a financial quagmire. 
8 Dependence upon international funding from the 1960s onwards began to rise as western
aid became easily  available  for newly decolonised countries.  Institutions  such as  the
World Bank and IMF became closely connected to the military dictatorship of Ayub Khan,
which ‘conceived and underwrote Pakistan’s  development  strategy’  (Alam 1995:  168).
Despite  concerns that  foreign aid might  compromise Bangladesh’s  independence,  the
Mujib  government  realised  that  it  was  key  to  its  survival  and  as  aid  revenue  grew
massively in the early post-independence period, the country became a celebrated ‘case
of aid-propelled development’ (Alam 1996).4 Thousands of foreign consultants, volunteers
and  diplomats  descended  on  Bangladesh.  Jobs  were  created  for  the  new  indigenous
bourgeoisie in emerging NGOs and myriad development projects across the country. 
9 Following Mujib’s  assassination in 1975,  which Khan (2000:  581-582)  attributes  to his
economic mismanagement,  the country entered a long period of consecutive military
dictatorships. From 1975 to 1990, foreign aid dependence went up further. This helped to
prop  up  the  dictators,  but  more  saliently,  brought  about  fundamental  shifts  in  the
country’s economic policies, moving it away from its founding principles. International
organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF induced the regimes to liberalise the
economy, accelerate privatisation and undertake structural adjustment. The development
strategies pursued under the General Zia and General Ershad regimes saw the unpicking
of policies laid down by Mujib.  Neoliberal reformers envisaged that such steps would
resolve the symptoms of the post-independence crisis. 
It is at this point that the growth in NGOs began; there was real optimism that they would
solve many of the country’s problems. Here, a comparison with the past is illuminating.
There were many international NGOs carrying out relief work in the country during the
crisis of the early 1970s, but relatively few indigenous ones were established. This is
because, as Hasan says, there was anticipation that the government would look after rural
people (Hasan 1993: 94, Lewis 2004: 307, see also Feldman 1997). This point is crucial in
appreciating what was anticipated. The state gradually became unable to deliver rural or
urban development and the hopes raised first in 1947, and then in 1971, were unrealised.
Consequently, as Lewis (2004: 307) observes, activists and social entrepreneurs began to
search for new organisational structures with which to address public problems (as well
as to build personal careers) and the boom in indigenous NGOs began. 
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10 The programme of  economic  liberalisation initiated under  Generals  Zia  and Ershad’s
dictatorships has accelerated since the establishment of democracy. The first democratic
government  in  1992  also  continued  the  privatisation  of  the  public  sector  and  lifted
market restrictions.  Institutions that were seen to distort market outcomes,  facilitate
collective action and centre on a planned economy, labour relations and social policy
were targeted and dismantled (Taylor 2009: 29-30). Ferguson (2006: 12), writing about
African states, but applicable to Bangladesh, says that the promise of democracy was held
out  to  the  citizenry  at  the  precise  moment  that  crucial  issues  with  regards  to  the
economy were taken out of the hands of national governments. Democracy, he argues,
became a way of cynically attributing blame to national governments (and by implication
to voters themselves) for economic failures. At the same time, matters to do with the
policies of donors were taken out of the realm of representative democracy. 
 
Background to the Border
11 The village of Boropani was divided in two at Partition in 1947. Today it is at the centre of
the cross-border coal  trade between India and Bangladesh.  The mines are all  on the
Indian  side  in  the  West  Khasi  Hills  and  the  labourers  are  mainly  from  Bangladesh
‘illegally’  crossing the border to work in them. The state in Bangladeshi  Boropani  is
represented by the Customs House at  the Zero Point  and the rotating contingent  of
Bangladesh Rifles guards who are charged with protecting the border. The concentration
of these categories of employees / institutions in the area indicates the state’s concerns
and interests at the border: primarily to generate profit from and maintain its authority
through sanctioning cross-border activities. This feature of the margins of Bangladesh
and India has not altered since the formation of the new states and, if anything, has been
exacerbated since then. Vote-garnering political candidates make occasional visits. The
nearest  bank,  police  station,  and  health  facilities  are  some  hours  away  in  the
headquarters of the district subdivision in which Boropani is located. Sunamgonj town,
the district’s main administrative centre, is around six hours away by boat during the wet
season and at least two by motorbike when dry. Locals forced to take their ill  family
members on this arduous journey may have to go to Sylhet town, a further two hours
away.  It  is  usually  the  more  affluent  and  the  most  desperate  who  carry  out  this
expedition. 
12 Yet the reasons for the lack of the state here are more complicated than Ong’s assertion
(2005: 95) that there is a ‘thinning of state power at…border zones’. Across Bangladesh,
the state is thinned out. In this regard, there is little difference between border and non-
border areas. However, in Boropani, present realities are in contrast to what previously
existed here. The developmental trajectory that newly independent, post-colonial states
followed in the mid-20th century is writ small here. In the 1960s a limestone quarry was
built  next  to  Boropani  as  part  of  the  newly  decolonised  country’s  attempts  at
modernisation. The aim of the Khonighat Limestone Mining Project was not simply to
extract limestone,  though  this  was  of  course  one  of  its  core  functions.  During  its
operation, it was at the centre of a much larger, protracted utopian goal that constituted
a project of a different order (see Hussain 2013 for a more detailed exploration of the
workings  of  the  Khonighat  Project).  Within  the  perimeters  at  least,  the  ‘corporeal
presence of the state [wa]s potent’ (Roy 1994: 105). As an inciter of modernity, it was to
re-write history, question old structures, banish ‘backwardness’ to a distant past and be
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at the forefront of the new world order for everyone and everything that came into
contact with it. Project workers and their families who came to live and work in this
remote part of the border were to be part of the modern industrial workforce but more
importantly, contemporary and enlightened citizens of the new modern state. They had
access to healthcare, housing, electricity and educational facilities.
13 Modernisation, the theory and practice, dictated that once peasants make the move from
working in the field to the factory, these so-called ‘backward’ people would be propelled
into  ‘civilisation’  and  the  future.  By  following  this  process,  poor  countries  would
overcome poverty, share in the prosperity of the ‘developed’ world and take their place
as equals in a worldwide family of nations (Ferguson 2006: 177). The idea was that the
state was at the centre of development programmes, preoccupied as it was with national
progress or, in other words, the development of the whole. Therefore, along with import
substitution and backing private entrepreneurship, state-led development concentrated
upon spectacular public works. Entire cities, such as Brasilia (Brazil), Islamabad (Pakistan)
and Chandigarh (India) were carved out where none existed previously. More commonly,
this  involved  building  infrastructure  (roads,  bridges),  developing  large-scale  power
projects (hydroelectricity dams, power stations), constructing industries (manufacturing,
refineries,  factories)  and  civic  institutions  (courts,  hospitals,  schools,  universities,
libraries, parliaments). Most of this was concentrated in urban centres, but ‘unknown’,
so-called  ‘peripheral’  places  (such  as  the  region  where  Khonighat  and  Boropani  are
located) were also targeted. 
14 The Project was closed down in the 1990s largely due to corruption, but also because of
neoliberal machinations at a grander scale (see Hussain 2013). It now lies in spectacular
ruin, a stark contrast to what it had attempted to be, the developing state in microcosm.
It  is  no  wonder  that  the  few  remaining  Project  residents  feel  an  acute  sense  of
abandonment and rejection when recalling the past. Nonetheless, what is worth keeping
in mind is that those who did not work for the Project, or lived outside of it in Boropani,
were unable to access the services it provided, so for many little has changed over the
years.5 Of  course Bangladesh (or the Pakistani  state previously)  was never a welfare-
heavy state as were/are the UK or the former USSR, for example. Neither was it ever in a
position to provide services for the majority of its citizenry. To argue, then, that in the
neoliberal  era,  the Bangladeshi  state  has  retreated,  as  many observers  have done,  is
inaccurate.  Modernisation  schemes  were  always  exceptional.  This  is  what  made  the
Khonighat Project so extraordinary and its visions so powerful for all those who came to
live and work there. Today the single, unitary idea of the state has become a rumour for
remaining Project  residents  (who thought  they knew better)  and recent  migrants  to
Boropani alike. Many people here have little to do with the reduced icons of the state that
do exist. While these are generally people at the very bottom of the social and economic
hierarchy, coal importers and depot managers also complain about the lack of facilities in
the area.  The argument they put forward for wanting greater state presence justifies
their evasion of taxes on the coal they import. One such businessman explains:
The government makes lakh lakh Taka from us [the coal industry] but would you be
able to tell what they have provided in return? The answer is no, nothing. There is
no school, no pucca road, nothing. I can afford to go to Sylhet when ill and send my
children there to be educated. But, tell me, what about the poor? What are they to
do? Tell me, what is the point of paying taxes?6 
15 In Boropani, NGOs delivering services include BRAC: the second largest employer in the
country after the government (Lewis 2010: 9), ASA (Association for Social Advancement),
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Sancred (a Norwegian organisation closely related to the Lutheran church) and also a
smattering of very small, grassroots, locally-focused organisations that specialise in the
wetland region. Sancred members are seen by a doctor for a 20 Taka fee (roughly 20
pence)  for  which  they  are  examined  and  provided  with  prescriptions.  The  cost  of
medicine  is  extra  and  those  requiring  more  complicated  procedures  are  sent  to
Sunamgonj.  BRAC  offers  loans  to  purchase  solar  power  facilities  as  well  as  general
business loans. One organisation brings a vet from Sunamgonj a few times a month to
treat livestock belonging to members. All of them specialise in microcredit programmes,
which is how they fund the services they provide. Locals do not remember precisely when
NGOs began arriving in the area, but some say Sancred was the first to set up its offices
outside of the perimeters of the Project. A neighbour remembers seeing a white woman
whom people believed to be a Christian missionary. Apparently her presence was not
welcomed by locals who would throw stones at her. The arrival of the NGOs in the area in
the 1990s coincided with the closure of the Project, the opening up of Bangladesh and
India’s markets and the beginning of the abdication by the state of what many in the
borderlands had come to expect from it.
 
Relief
16 It is the monsoon season. I am invited by Tariq, a local friend who works for an NGO, to
accompany him on a relief programme that is to take place in the wetlands that surround
Boropani on the Bangladeshi side. Tariq works for a large European NGO, which I call
Hands  Together,7 based  at  its  regional  office  in  Sunamgonj.  Hands  Together  runs  a
number of  programmes throughout Bangladesh,  one of  twenty countries it  works in.
Tariq is in charge of coordinating the relief and I am joining him on the day corrugated
tin is being handed out. I am keen to observe this ritual. Crucially, it is from isolated
villages such as the one we are to visit that the majority of the seasonal and temporary
coal labourers in Boropani that I had hitherto been working with, originally came from
(see Hussain 2013). When the waters of the monsoon take over their rice fields, men,
women, and children migrate to Boropani and devote themselves to coal extraction. At
least some of the money earned in the cross-border coal trade between Bangladesh and
India comes back to villages such as this. 
17 In 2007, a flash flood destroyed large numbers of homes in a particularly isolated part of
the wetlands. Today’s relief—NGO jargon for the distribution of aid materials—is a one-off
event to be carried out in a village in which one of Hands Together’s local partners, a
grassroots, community-based organisation which I call NAT, has been working for some
years. NAT specialises in development projects in the wetland region.8 The schemes it
runs include setting up shomithis (committees) to which it provides ideas and logistics for
income generation. But it is microfinance that it is principally concerned with. Affected
villagers that NAT work with are to receive building materials, as well as ducks and goats.
All of this is funded by Hands Together. 
18 On the back of Tariq’s Indian Hero Honda motorbike, we follow the now disjointed and
broken railway tracks that lead from Khonighat to Poschim Bazaar. When the state-run
installation was still  in operation,  the limestone from the quarries in Khonighat was
transported to  Poschim Bazaar,  uploaded onto  barges,  and sent  to  the  headquarters
where it was processed into cement. No longer with a role to play in the modernisation of
cities elsewhere, today Poschim Bazaar looks as forlorn and stranded as Khonighat. With
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no sign of a boat that will take us to the village, Tariq confides that he is nervous about
the distribution. Heated words have already been exchanged between Hands Together’s
regional office in Sunamgonj, the community-based organisation NAT, and the villagers
expecting relief. Apparently, the list of names that was originally drawn up—of people
who are to receive the building materials and livestock, supposedly the most severely
affected  by  the  devastation  in  2007—had  to  be  re-done.  According  to  Tariq,  NAT
employees had filled it with names of their own relatives, denying those who are the
neediest. The Sunamgonj office learned of this and instructed NAT’s staff to re-do the list,
threatening to deny them any future project work and funding if they do not comply. The
second list that was drawn up has a different set of names, but, as Tariq explains ‘there is
no way of checking the validity of the revised list’. 
19 What adds to Tariq’s troubles is that Hands Together’s country head office in Dhaka has
ordered the regional office in Sunamgonj  to ensure that  the distribution goes ahead
without any glitches, despite the problem with the lists. This order came from Hands
Together’s main donor office in Europe. The European head office is answerable to its
own national government and tax payers, and the international and corporate donors it
receives funding from and (to a limited extent) the Bangladeshi government, but not to
those that the policies affect the most.  This draws attention to the uneasy fit  of  the
multiple  governing  agencies,  policies  dreamed  up  in  global  cities  and  multinational
institutions and practices that are rolled out on the ground in developing countries. Tariq
says this sort of muddle happens frequently. As if to underscore the nervousness he feels,
as we wait for a boat, Tariq receives a phone call from his staff still expecting us at the
village. They have been sworn at by people whose names have been removed from the
original list and who will no longer be receiving aid. With no alternative way of getting to
the village, Tariq talks about turning back and cancelling the distribution. The recipients
will have to go empty handed and the barge hired for the day to transport the corrugated
tin will return to Sunamgonj, its cargo intact. This will mean added costs, which officials
in Dhaka will complain about and the donor will disapprove of.
20 Suddenly, a tiny rowing boat appears on the horizon, steered by two soaking wet little
boys who look like they are barely more than 10 years old. Despite my reluctance, I am
persuaded that the journey to the village is not far. The boys eventually row up to the
village;  it  is  situated  upon  raised  land  in  the  middle  of  the  water.  The  only  pukka
(concrete)  building is  the school,  which also serves as the flood and cyclone shelter,
occasional administrative office and now, relief distribution centre. Other than this, there
is no physical presence of the state here. There is no electricity, bureaucracy or health
facility. The select group of sixty or so villagers that are to receive aid have been waiting
for us since day-break. By now it is mid afternoon. Nearly all are women (Karim 2011).
They are skinny, possibly part of the proportion of the population who only have access
to one or two meals a day. The men of the village who are of working age are either in the
mines in India hewing coal, or in Bangladeshi Boropani labouring in the transportation
end of the trade. Some able-bodied men have been called back to the village to help
mothers  and  wives  with  the  sheets  of  tin  they  will  receive.  Nonetheless,  whilst  the
industry has invariably benefitted some, in particular those with previous connections to
the Project, the liberalisation of the Bangladeshi and Indian economies has not financially
or materially improved the lives of the majority of its workers.
21 Tariq begins the proceedings by impressing upon the villagers that his staff should be
able  to  work in  the  area  without  being harassed.  He looks  slightly  anxious  but  also
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extremely  authoritative  as  he  talks.  Though only  in his  late  twenties,  his  university
degree and the backing of the foreign NGO give him confidence. The villagers refer to
Tariq as ‘officer’, addressing him as ‘sir’; terms of deference traditionally used to address
government bureaucrats,  illustrating how boundaries between the state and the NGO
sector are blurred. Tariq is one of increasing numbers of bright and energetic young
Bangladeshi graduates who, in recent years, have opted to work for the NGO sector; in an
earlier period they would have hoped to work for the government. ‘Hope’ is the operative
term here as  public  sector  jobs  were always limited and difficult  to  acquire without
connections  and/or  leverage.  There  is  a  widespread  perception  that  there  are  more
opportunities and better pay and conditions working for NGOs (especially foreign ones),
than within government employment. Nonetheless, public sector positions are still held
in high regard despite (or perhaps because of) being associated with corruption, sloth,
ineptitude and patronage. Tariq says he would prefer a stable, permanent government
job, even with less pay, than a better paid NGO one. With flexible labour markets having
emerged in all areas of work, he also has to re-apply every couple of years for his position
and is hence unable to plan for the future in case he is made redundant. He says that he
aims to make the switch to a government job once he has put in sufficient time working
for Hands Together. It would be extremely difficult for him to get a government job had
he not taken this route.9 
22 One of Tariq’s two staff members is a woman; she it is who the irritated villagers were
particularly abusive towards. Her gender made her a soft target for their frustrations and
allowed for comments and insults attacking her ‘virtue’. ‘She has come all the way from
dry land to this wet land to help you. She doesn’t need to do this’ Tariq chastises the
villagers. ‘She is also someone’s daughter, someone’s wife. She should not have to hear
bad things said about her.’ He attempts to talk to some of the Group Representatives of
the shomithi to appeal to what, he believes, are common gendered aims and sympathies.
These are a handful of women from the village who have been elected by the rest of the
shomithi to represent them in all matters relating to NAT’s work. They have experience of
labouring in the coal industry and with it, all its concomitant issues as working women.
Having group representatives is not only pragmatic, but in the discourse of contemporary
development they are part of an emerging social agenda which supposedly improves the
public  ‘visibility’  and  status  of  women,  encourages  ‘participation’  and  ‘democratic
decision-making’  and  contributes  to  wider  ‘community  development’  and
‘empowerment’.10
23 Sharma & Gupta (2006: 21) argue that initiatives such as group representatives attempt to
teach  people,  in  this  case  women,  how  to  build  their  ‘capacities’  and  become  ‘self
dependent,  responsible  citizens  who can take  care  of  their  own welfare  and govern
themselves’. In this moment and place, the success of the group representatives seems
questionable. The women simply huddle next to one another on the bench allocated to
them, not saying a word. They chew on the ends of their sarees in trepidation and seem
very uncomfortable at  being called to speak in public  by Tariq.  This  is  in particular
because they may find themselves at odds either with their own neighbours or with the
authority (and prospective resources) of the NGOs. The group representatives, it seems,
do not consider the female development worker to be one of their own, or at the very
least,  one worth defending. Her education, class,  job and language are more effective
dividers  than her  gender  is  a  unifier.  These  women seem a  world  away from those
Rahman (1999: 95) writes about, members of the Grameen microcredit bank, who he says
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are ‘more vocal and articulate compared to other women in the village who are not […]
members’. In fact, here, it is women not receiving and who have nothing to do with NAT
and Hands Together’s development work who are the most vocal  in expressing their
disapproval of the erasure of their neighbour’s names from the list.
24 At this point, a self appointed village representative, a man with traditional capital as
opposed to the group representatives who are, in effect, pretenders put forward by the
NGO,  begins  to  shout  about  the  lists.  He  is  angry  and  demands  to  see  the  original,
accusing  Tariq  and his  staff  of  cheating  the  recipients.  It  becomes  obvious  that  the
villagers cannot or, rather, do not differentiate between the representatives of Hands
Together and those of NAT whom they had, up until then, been dealing with. Tariq’s two
colleagues were previously employed by NAT.  Furthermore,  with the majority of  the
funding and project work that NAT does coming from Hands Together, all taking place
conveniently under the banner of ‘partnerships’, the institutional separateness between
the organisations is only notional. Is NAT a grassroots organisation? Is Hands Together an
international organisation? Ferguson & Gupta (2005: 117) argue that such entities not
only do not fit easily within the ‘state’ versus ‘civil society’ grid, but also that they cannot
easily be labelled ‘local’,  ‘national’  or ‘international’.  They embody a significant local
dynamic and are also at the same time a product and expression of powerful national,
regional and global forces. The myth that they are independent is something that both
NAT  and  Hands  Together  attempt  to  maintain,  though  it  is  at  odds  with  everyday
experiences, leading to the evident tensions.
25 Tariq warns me that the last thing he wants is to argue with the villagers, in particular
because he fears that a physical altercation over the lists may be likely. He suspects that
some  of  the  people  on  the  original  list  may  have  paid  goosh (a  bribe)  to  NAT
representatives (not the two assistants) to be on it, hence they may be particularly cross
at being struck off.  The fee may have been a few hundred Taka (a few pounds),  but
nonetheless would still  have been cheaper than buying tin on the open market.  The
practice of charging a fee for services that should be free for users is generally morally
condemned in mainstream Bangladeshi society, but it is in fact extremely common when
dealing  with  official  government  bureaucracies.  In  the  borderlands  this  ranges  from
paying the border guards to sanction illegal  mining in the border zone,  to  ensuring
paperwork is  processed by the Customs Official.  It  is  plainly  a  bureaucratic  working
practice that has seeped into the privatised realms, further collapsing the distinctions
between the various governing agencies operating here and their behavioural practices.
Tariq tries to take charge of the situation, telling the accuser that if he so wishes, he is
welcome to go to the Hands Together office in Sunamgonj where they have copies of the
first list. ‘But for today, I have been instructed by my managers to distribute tin only to
people whose names are on the second list’ he says. The man responds that if he were to
go to Sunamgonj, it would mean losing a second day’s wages. He works as a coal labour
leader in Boropani and has already lost income from having to stay in the village that day.
Tariq says that Hands Together will refund his journey, if he can provide receipts for it.
This is of course an underhand trick, a receipt being a commodity that no one in the
borderlands deals with. The distribution finally begins, Tariq’s efforts overcoming any
nascent attempt at resistance against the NGO staff by aggrieved villagers. 
26 Despite the villagers knowing the NGO staff, there is little trust between the givers and
the receivers. The NGO staff are concerned that the villagers may simply storm the barge
that contains the sheets of tin and walk off with them. The poor are inherently distrusted
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in  this  country  of  poor  people.  By  this  time  I  was  accustomed  to  this  and  would
experience it frequently and in a variety of ways. The poor are thought of as dishonest,
dirty, carriers of disease and peddlers of social ills (perhaps not too dissimilar from how
some international donors may view Bangladesh and the people of the ‘Third World’
generally, as the particular programmes directed at them show). It is not just amongst the
wealthy and influential that this attitude is pervasive, but also amongst those of more
modest means, as well  as the ‘poor’  themselves.  The ‘NGO-wallahs’  are on the whole,
young, university educated men, ostensibly liberal, secular and open-minded individuals
who put a high value on female education and emancipation. However, when it comes to
ideas about the ghorib  (the poor),  their  comments and ideas seem to hark back to a
familiar colonial past. But rather than the topic of criticism being ‘the natives’, here it is
their own countrymen. Fear and stereotypes intermingle with feelings of superiority and
the burden of  responsibility  to  ‘civilise  and develop’  the unfortunate.  Such attitudes
among government-employed development workers were one of the things it was hoped
that funding through NGOs would overcome. The fact that the shomithis they organise in
the border region on the whole make a living not from agriculture and fishing (as the
deserving poor do) but in the quasi-legal cross-border coal trade, intensifies this attitude.
This is regardless of the fact that their organisations benefit financially from the regular
micro-loan repayments made by coal labourers, with added bonuses and commissions.
But instead of attempting to better the working and living conditions of their members,
the development workers take a morally superior stance against those they work with. 
27 Before the actual distribution can begin, Tariq makes a further announcement. Rather
than receiving six sheets of tin, as previously pledged, everyone on the list will be getting
five. Some complain, but these are desperate people, they are used to broken promises
and disappointments. Tariq does not publically announce why this is, but he tells me later
that it is because NAT, as well as having responsibility for drawing up the list of receivers,
had been in charge of procurement. Senior members of the organisation embezzled funds
and as a consequence fewer sheets were eventually bought. Added to this, the sheets were
in fact second rate.
28 Tariq’s colleagues have already handed out chits of paper to the recipients; these have the
recipients’ names and their father’s names written on them. When a name is called out,
the recipient goes to the table where Tariq’s assistants match the chit to the official list.
S/he then either signs or prints her/his thumb, indicating that they have received their
sheets. They then show the ticket to Tariq who is standing on the barge and five sheets of
tin are passed down. Older men and women are able to sign their names; not having held
a  pen  in  their  hands  for  some  time,  their  signatures  are  child-like  scrawls,  but
nonetheless, they are able to sign. One woman, offended by the assertion that she may
need the inkpad,  states,  ‘I  want the pen.  I  know how to write my own name’. Some
youngsters, collecting on behalf of others, cannot do what the old woman is able to and
stamp their thumbs. The difference between the two is indicative of a time not so long
ago when it was believed that education would help people, and the nation itself, out of
poverty: an aspect of the modernisation theory that has lost the sway that it once held. I
am not suggesting that everyone used to know how to write their name;  in fact the
ledgers which recorded the workings of Khonighat show that the majority of labourers
put thumb prints on payment sheets and did not sign. This of course does not indicate
whether  they were  literate  or  not,  but  what  it  does  reaffirm is  that  the  benefits  of
modernisation were only for a few and not all. Furthermore, nationally, literacy rates and
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the numbers of children attending state schools, in particular girls, are on the rise today
and this is something that is internationally recognised and praised. 
29 Chits  and  sheets  of  tin  are  exchanged,  counted  and  dispensed.  There  are  constant
complaints and grumbles from villagers. This seems to be the customary way of behaving
towards authority, in the same way that it is Tariq’s to look commanding and official.
‘What is the point of five sheets of tin? You can’t even build a toilet with five. You need
eighteen in total to build a house’ someone says. Another retaliates, ‘when you go to a
wedding, you don’t expect to eat all the food, do you? So why complain so much?’. I meet
a coal labourer in the throng. He has been called back from Boropani by his aged mother
to help her with her allotted tin. He earns roughly 300 Taka (£3) per day by lugging coal
sacks from the depot area to the river. Each sheet of tin costs 400 Taka (£4). What will you
do with the tin? ‘I will strengthen my house with them’ he replies. ‘Half of my mud house
was washed away in the flood’. Tariq believes some of the recipients will go on to sell
their donations. Despite NAT’s chicanery, what is abundantly clear is that those who have
been struck off the first list seem as poor and needy as those whose names are on the
second list. By denying aid to those on the first list, Hands Together believes it is taking
an explicit moral stance against what it labels ‘corruption’. It expects to wipe clean such
ingrained cultural and operational practices and exercise its own ‘organisational culture’
(Lewis 2003: 214). 
30 In the classroom youngsters who have not been in one for a while although they are still
the right age to be at school, commandeer the chalk and doodle on the blackboard. ‘We
don’t  go to school’  they say,  smiling,  exposing iron eroded teeth.  ‘Can you read and
write?’ ‘No’ they say nervously. ‘We work in Boropani as day labourers. We don’t need to
know how to  read and write  to  do  that’.  They laugh.  ‘If  you are  not  careful’  I  say,
frustrated ‘then soon, you too will be waiting in the rain for tin’. ‘What are we to do, older
brother? We have to eat and feed our families. If knowing how to read and write would do
that, then of course we would. We are not stupid’. I watch people tend to their freshly cut
wounds while arguments over the lists as well as the rain continues unabated. 
31 More accusations and counter-accusations of corruption are hurled when a Member from
the Union Parishad (council) arrives. His belated appearance in the village coincides with
our preparations to leave. All the tin has been distributed. The Member is furious at Tariq
for  not  consulting  him before  the  distribution occurred,  implying  that  as  a  publicly
elected state official, his authority is greater and has been called into question. According
to Tariq, the Member was told about it.  The man conflates Hands Together and NAT,
insinuating that the staff of both organisations have been cheating villagers. He plays on
the increasingly generalised views of NGOs in Bangladesh as simply being interested in
the material wellbeing of their staff and not the people they are supposed to be helping.
This also draws attention to the practical  knowledge of the multiplicity of governing
agencies that the villagers have. They are willing to accept the resources of the NGOs, but
when they feel aggrieved, turn to others within the conglomeration that produce state-
like effects, even pitting one organisation against another. The Member threatens Tariq,
telling him not to set foot in his constituency ever again. One is left thinking that if he is
exemplary of the quality of representative democracy in Bangladesh, there is little doubt
why the country’s poor suffer so much. 
32 On the deck of the barge back to Khonighat, it all seems so futile. By the end of the day,
the only sign of relief is on the faces of Tariq and his staff, glad to be leaving the area. The
villagers look as disgruntled and unsatisfied as when we arrived, their experience of the
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various governing agencies leaving them none the wiser as to what to do, or who to turn
to next time an unexpected flash flood destroys their homes. Regardless of who or what
the state is, and even in its multiple forms, it has abandoned these people, its citizens.
The floods will return and simultaneously, a need and a tragedy for the people who live
and work in the cross-border coal trade. The multiple governing agents will go through
the motions, giving the impression that ‘something is being done’ to alleviate suffering
(in the extreme cases) and ‘development’ is being carried forth for those who require it in
the  everyday  sense.  The  system  that  causes  poverty,  alienation,  exploitation  or
marginalisation is not tackled, the status quo remains unquestioned. 
 
Conclusion
33 This paper has attempted to draw out how the state, in its current neoliberal avatar, has
been reconfigured from its older, developmental paradigm, which involved large-scale
infrastructural change and resource redistribution—aspects which many people continue
to  expect  and  associate  with  the  primary  workings  of  states.  Using  ethnographic
evidence, I suggest that the state is now merely one of many other multiple governing
agencies that participate in producing ‘state-like effects’ on a territory and its population.
Local, national, and international NGOs, all with an assortment of agendas and loyalties,
contribute to and produce ‘state-like effects’. Other than for a short time in the post-
independence period when there was ideological optimism to the contrary (when state-
run installations such as the Khonighat Limestone Mining project existed), the idea of the
centralised,  sovereign  Bangladeshi  state  from  a  fabled  past  being  eroded  by
neoliberalism, is not a complete story. The people of the region have always co-existed
alongside local, regional, and global entities. Nonetheless, how effective is the multiple
agents’ ability to bring about true and lasting transformations for the people who live and
work in the coal trade on the Bangladesh-India border, remains to be seen.
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NOTES
1. See also Hansen & Stepputat (2005).
2. To protect informants, this and other names are all pseudonyms. 
3. Other factors such as a massive cyclone, global financial meltdown due to the Oil crisis, the War of Independence and the withdrawal of
Pakistani administrators contributed to this too.
4. Before 1971, foreign aid to East Pakistan amounted to $4 per person. By the mid 1970s it tripled, continuing to rise during the years of military
rule until it reached an all time high of $20 per Bangladeshi in 1990 (van Schendel 2009: 220). When the first Five Year Plan of the new country
was published in 1973, it was projected that 39% of the total development investment would be made by foreign aid and by 1978, dependence on
foreign aid would decrease to 27%. However the Two Year Plan (1977-1979) found that 72% of total developmental investments came from foreign
sources. During the Third Five Year Plan (1985-1990), the amount increased to 80%. Foreign aid increased to $130 million during the fiscal years
1985-1986 (Alam 1996: 93).
5. For more information about the Project, see Hussain 2013.
6. Interview by author, Boropani, 29 April 2009.
7. I am using a pseudonym for both NGOs to protect the identities of people
8. The region has recently become a site for much development work. The British Department for International Development, amongst other
foreign countries, is funding a number of community-based organisations who all work in the wetlands.
9. Lewis (2010) also finds that the boundaries between government, business, and civil society are
extremely ambiguous but nonetheless they continue to be constructed and maintained by the
agents themselves, as well as by those on the receiving end of their resources and services.
10. See Feldman and E. McCarthy (1983) for further discussion. 
ABSTRACTS
By focusing on a remote part of the Bangladesh-India border, this paper seeks to understand how
the state has been reconfigured from its older, developmental paradigm, involving large-scale
infrastructural change and resource redistribution, to its contemporary NGO-driven avatar. The
paper suggests that the state today is merely one of multiple governing agencies that participate
in producing ‘state-like effects’ on a territory and its population. Sometimes these agencies are in
competition; often they work alongside one another. NGOs are agencies of this kind and are a
major focus of this paper. In light of this, the idea of a sovereign Bangladeshi state which is
apparently being eroded by neoliberalism, is  not a complete picture.  Other than a particular
moment  in  the  post-colonial  period  where  there  was  optimism  that  the  contrary  would  be
achieved, sovereignty has in fact always been a mediated, fragmented affair in the borderlands as
well as in Bangladesh as a whole. 
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